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Masked marketing—one form of covert marketing—involves marketing communications that appear to
be from independent third parties rather than from product marketers. This article presents a typology
of masked marketing practices, illustrating whether they may be deceptive to consumers. To
accomplish this, the authors apply the Federal Trade Commission’s three-part definition of deception
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It is estimated that consumers are bombarded by some5000 overt marketing communications daily but are soaccustomed to such messages that they consciously per-
ceive only 1%–2% of them (Pringle 2004, pp. 60–61). Not
only can consumers not possibly process so many mes-
sages, but surveys also indicate that, in general, most con-
sumers are skeptical of marketing messages (Calfee and
Ringold 1994; Obermiller and Spangenberg 2000; Ober-
miller, Spangenberg, and MacLachlin 2005). In addition, a
recent set of studies suggests that consumers who are actu-
ally deceived by an advertisement become skeptical of all
advertising but not skeptical of product information pro-
vided by nonmarketing sources (Darke and Ritchie 2007).
For these reasons, consumers tend to ignore most marketing
messages. Covert marketers hope to avoid both consumer
disinterest and skepticism of marketing communications by
communicating in ways that are perceived as not being
marketing communications (Kaikati and Kaikati 2004). In
addition, some methods of masked marketing, such as prod-
uct placements in television shows, allow for the circum-
vention of advertising-avoiding technology. Some methods
also have the added advantage of being less expensive than
conventional methods of advertising.
Masked marketing is one form of covert marketing. We
suggest that there are at least two other forms of covert mar-
keting. The first is referred to as “mole marketing”; this is
when marketers attempt to reach potential consumers with a
recognizable marketing message but through unconven-
tional means. Examples of such practices include ad-ware
surreptitiously placed on consumer computers to send
advertising messages while consumers are searching the
Web and advertising messages sent to cell phones, at least
in the United States where the practice is not yet familiar to
consumers (Petty 2003). We refer to a second set of prac-
tices as “mental marketing” because the marketing mes-
sages are not consciously perceived or evaluated but still
might influence behavior. Examples of this type of practice
include the much-discredited subliminal advertising (e.g.,
Broyles 2006; Moore 1982) and the use of nonverbal sen-
sory stimuli to predispose consumers favorably toward
products (Lindstrom 2005), including pictorial imagery
(Kisielius and Sternthal 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981).
Together with masked marketing, we refer to these sets of
practices as the “three Ms” of covert marketing.
We define “masked marketing” as marketing communi-
cations that appear not to be marketing communications.
These communications may be masked as to their commer-
cial source, their commercial message, or both. Such mask-
ing raises public policy concerns because though most con-
sumers are skeptical of advertising, they are less skeptical
about information that appears to be independent from mar-
keters (Balasubramanian 1994; Darke and Ritchie 2007).
For example, a recent global survey of Internet users found
that 78% trusted recommendations from consumers, but
only 56% trusted television and magazine advertising
(Nielsen 2007). Indeed, many consumers have developed
methods to cope with overt attempts at persuasion (e.g.,
“schemer schemas”; Friestad and Wright 1994). In addition,
some forms of masked marketing appear as personal com-
munications and may target groups that are more suscepti-
ble to interpersonal influence than typical consumers (Bear-
den, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989; Churchill and Moschis
1979; Phillips and Sternthal 1977).
Although terms such as “buzz” and “viral” marketing are
relatively new to the lexicon, masked marketing has been
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Table 1. A Typology of Masked Marketing Practices
Practice Description
Posers (disguised
communicator)
Actors or salespeople who pretend to
be ordinary people or researchers
conducting a survey to explain
product benefits and give potential
consumers the chance to examine,
sample, or use a product.
Buzz and viral
marketing (disguised
communicator)
Recruitment of people to talk about
products through free samples or
discounts before the product is
available to the general public and
suggestions on what to say and how to
approach people about the product.
Some refer to this as viral marketing
when the contact with potential
consumers is done electronically.
Advertorials (disguised
format)
Advertisements that appear to be
information from an independent
source, such as prepared television
news stories; infomercials that appear
to be consumer television shows; and
print advertisements that appear to be
editorial content.
Ad-sults from a search
engine or other query
(disguised format)
Use of invisible metatags by a
marketer or the sale of priority by a
search engine of the results from a
particular query when the results are
not identified as biased.
Urgent ad-formation
(disguised format)
Advertisements that appear in the
form of important account information
from firms with an existing business
relationship, government notices,
sweepstakes prize notices, or checks
that are simply discount coupons.
Advertainment 
(disguised format)
Product and advertising placement in
television shows, at sporting events,
and in video games.
practiced and regulated for more than 75 years. For exam-
ple, in 1936, a court held that endorsements by apparently
independent expert organization were deceptive because the
organization was not financially independent from the
advertiser (Gynex Corp. v. Dilex Inst. of Feminine Hygiene
1936). The next year, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fed-
eral Trade Commission’s (FTC) condemnation as an unfair
method of competition of the practice of sales agents gain-
ing entrance to homes by purporting to deliver only a free
prize or booklet but then making the sales pitch once they
had gained access (FTC v. Standard Education Society
1937). Later FTC cases have also condemned marketing
messages as deceptive for appearing to be checks (United
States v. Reader’s Digest Association 1981), even from the
government (A.A. Friedman Co. 1968), or prize awards
(National Housewares Inc. 1977).
Although the practice of masked marketing predates the
FTC’s deception authority (granted by Congress in 1938),
virtually any legal challenge to such practices today would
occur under this authority. The commission’s “Policy State-
ment on Deception” (FTC 1983) presents a thoughtful, gen-
eral analysis of deception, though largely in the context of
misleading product claims. The statement addresses masked
marketing when it specifically notes with apparent approval
that the FTC found deception when a sales agent misrepre-
sented the purpose of the initial contact with potential cus-
tomers (Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. v. FTC 1979).
This article unmasks masked marketing techniques and
examines the legal and regulatory issues associated with
such practices. To do so, it follows the FTC’s three-part
deception analysis: Is the practice likely to mislead con-
sumers? Are misled consumers behaving reasonably? and Is
the practice material (i.e., likely to affect consumer con-
duct)? The article concludes with policy recommendations
and suggestions for further research.
The Misleading Nature of Masked
Marketing Practices
Under the current “Policy Statement on Deception” (FTC
1983), the first requirement for deception is that there must
be a representation, omission, or practice that is “likely to
mislead” the consumer (see also Ford and Calfee 1986;
Shimp 2007). A “misrepresentation” is defined as an
express or implied statement contrary to fact, whereas a
“misleading omission” occurs when qualifying information
necessary to prevent a practice, claim, representation, or
reasonable expectation or belief from being misleading is
not disclosed. As applied to masked marketing practices,
the first question is whether there is an express or implied
representation or an omission that the communication is not
a marketing communication. If a poser, buzz, or viral agent
or an advertorial denied any commercial connection or mar-
keting purpose, there would be an express representation
that was false. However, most of the examples we discuss
subsequently involve an implied representation that the
message is not marketing related because the communica-
tion appears to be of a nonmarketing nature. Even if there is
not an implied representation of a nonmarketing origin to
the communication, the omission of the marketing origin is
probably material to reasonable consumers, as we discuss
subsequently. To aid in the evaluation of misleadingness of
masked marketing practices, Table 1 organizes such prac-
tices into six categories. The first two categories involve
source masking, and the latter four involve masking the
message format. We should note, however, that not all dis-
guises are deceptive to consumers. Most consumers are
familiar with actors in television commercials portraying
ordinary consumers and product users (e.g., Mr. Whipple
for Charmin toilet tissue, Mr. Goodwrench for General
Motors auto service, and the Maytag repairman).
Posers
In contrast to actors in television advertisements, some mar-
keting companies hire paid actors or marketing agents to
pretend that they are ordinary product users and to talk to
people about the products being marketed. Such actors or
agents may be called posers. Vespa scooters hired models
and actors to cruise night clubs and cafés on their trendy
machines and “talk up” the product when they could. Per-
haps the most infamous example of posers is Sony Erics-
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son’s use of 120 actors at popular tourist locations posing as
tourists and asking people to take their picture using the
phone and then taking that opportunity to explain how the
camera aspect and its features worked (Dobele, Toleman,
and Beverlan 2005). This particular incident, as well as
similar practices, was featured on the CBS news show 60
Minutes (2004). Potential consumers in these situations
were not told at the time of the marketing purpose of these
paid actors, and some seemed upset when they learned
about this purpose during interviews for the show. Simi-
larly, Sony set up a blog called “All I want for Christmas is
a PSP” (PlayStation Portable), but when consumers discov-
ered that Sony’s advertising agency owned the domain
name, it faced negative publicity (Goodman 2007). Posers
may also be celebrities who are paid to promote a product
in the course of their regular celebrity interviews (Bandler
2005). Kaikati and Kaikati (2004, p. 12) describe three
morning talk show interviews with celebrities in which they
each described medical problems and the product that
helped them without disclosing that they were paid to pro-
mote the product.
Although the FTC has not taken action against any of
these examples, it pursued Georgetown Publishing for what
appeared to be a personal communication on a small adhe-
sive yellow note attached that appeared handwritten: “Try
this. It works! (signed) J.” Recipients probably pondered
who among their acquaintances with an initial of “J” might
have sent this message. This communication also was dis-
guised to appear as a personal mailing of what appeared to
be an independent book review torn from a magazine and
ordering information for the book on public speaking that
was the subject of a book review. Georgetown agreed not to
misrepresent that future advertisements were not advertise-
ments (Georgetown Publishing House LP Inc. 1996). With
the advent of Internet sales, today’s posers often do not
need to reveal that they are paid marketing agents, unlike
the commissioned sales agents who needed to close a sale
to earn the commission and therefore eventually revealed
their marketing purpose. Today, consumers are likely to be
misled by such low-key appearances and the lack of clear
and conspicuous disclosure.
Buzz and Viral Marketing
Buzz and viral marketing include techniques designed to
encourage word-of-mouth promotion by consumers. Viral
marketing is often defined as buzz marketing conducted by
electronic technology, such as e-mail, chat rooms, blogs,
and text messaging (Dobele, Toleman, and Beverland
2005). Kaikati and Kaikati (2004, p. 9) provide an even
simpler definition of viral marketing: “word of mouth via a
digital platform.” Estimates place the amount of money
being spent on buzz marketing at $40–$60 million in 2004,
up 100% from the prior year (Creamer 2005). Advertising
Age estimates industry size to be between $100 million and
$150 million (Horowitz 2005).
In the case of both buzz and viral marketing, the goal is
to encourage conversation about the product. Buzz and viral
agents differ from posers in that the former are actual con-
sumers and the latter are hired actors or marketing represen-
tatives. However, in a blog or chat room, it is difficult to tell
the identity of the person posting. Is he or she a consumer
who was given a product sample and asked to talk about it
with friends, or is he or she a marketing agent, perhaps one
that works full time for the company marketing the
product?
The practices range from simply offering a trendy prod-
uct, such as Chrysler’s PT Cruiser, to Miami rental car
companies trying to get consumers to rent cars and hope-
fully to talk to others about their experience, to encouraging
consumers to “talk up” a product by providing rewards and/
or “talking points.” One advantage of viral marketing is that
video or audio files can be sent to opinion leaders with the
hope that they will resend them to others. For example, Lee
Jeans sent 200,000 male Web surfers amateurish video clips
from three purportedly amateur filmmakers. The purported
filmmakers turned out to be characters in an online video
game. More than 100,000 people were sufficiently intrigued
to get a Lee product code to watch the videos, and Lee sales
increased 20% (Khermouch and Green 2001). A second
advantage of technology in viral marketing is that agents
can appear in more places virtually. They can be in chat
rooms, on bulletin boards and blogs, and sending e-mail or
text messages to friends.
When buzz agents are involved, these programs typically
provide suggestions to agents about product selling points
and general communication to consumers. However, they
typically do not require adherence to a script or particular
program, and agents enjoy being the first to receive and try
new products, sometimes through discounts on the items
(Walker 2004). More organized programs recruit a large
continuing group of thought leaders. These programs
become controversial when they offer rewards to agents but
do not require that they disclose this commercial connec-
tion. Procter & Gamble’s group, Tremor, was featured in a
recent complaint to the FTC by Commercial Alert (2005)
for inadequate disclosure to parents involving buzz market-
ing activities using teens and children. In contrast, Bzz-
Agent found that its campaigns were more effective when
agents revealed that they were working for a particular
client (Creamer 2005). A recent unpublished study noted
that important outcome measures, such as credibility,
inquiry, use, purchase, and pass-along communication,
were not negatively affected by a buzz agent disclosing his
or her affiliation (Carl 2006).
To the extent that buzz and viral agents believe that they
are presenting their honest opinions, this practice may be
less troubling than posers. It might be argued that free sam-
ples or discount coupons are less biasing than cash compen-
sation, and perhaps consumers expect some opinion leaders
to get free samples. Thus, this level of compensation or
affiliation may not be misleading to reasonable consumers
and need not be disclosed. To be effective, buzz or viral
marketing is typically spread among friends who know one
another and may be more likely to know that the agent is
part of a marketing program. However, viral marketing in
blogs or spam is more likely to occur from an unknown
source who appears to be an ordinary person not related to a
marketing campaign.
Advertorials
Advertorials are marketing messages disguised to appear as
independently produced media content. An increasingly
popular example is the video news release that is produced
by a marketer but is shown during a news broadcast. The
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Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently fined
Comcast for airing such a release without identifying the
commercial sponsor (Comcast Corp. 2007). In Georgetown
Publishing House (1996), the poser’s apparently personal
message included a detailed advertisement that appeared to
be an independent magazine review of the product rather
than an advertisement. Mail solicitations are increasingly
designed to look like personal mail, such as a greeting card
with a handwritten address and a postage stamp rather than
a postal meter cancellation, but these maskings have not
attracted legal challenge in and of themselves (Abelson
2005). In addition, the American Society of Magazine Edi-
tors guidelines recommend against placing advertisements
next to related editorial material in any way that suggests
endorsement. Furthermore, some advertisements deliber-
ately mimic editorial content of particular magazines
(Steinberg and Bandler 2004).
Marketing messages that appear as television shows are
commonly known as infomercials. The FTC has pursued
infomercials for being deceptively formatted as indepen-
dent television shows since at least 1989 (e.g., JS&A Group
Inc. 1989). Television infomercials have also been chal-
lenged as false advertising for making false product claims
(but not for being deceptively formatted) by competitors
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (e.g., Media Arts
Int’l Ltd. v. Trillium Health Products 1992). In 2004, the
FTC again took action against two infomercials that
appeared as independent television programs, with only
brief disclosures at the beginning and end that this was a
“paid advertisement” (FTC v. Direct Marketing Concepts
Inc. 2004; FTC v. Window Rock Enterprises Inc. et al.
2004). These infomercials also included “guest” doctors,
who were principals in the marketing firm, and supposedly
independent “viewer” questions, and they asked viewers to
mention the name of the show to receive a discount when
calling to order. In Braswell et al. (2006), the FTC found
false and misleading dietary supplement claims touting
medical and scientific “breakthroughs” targeting the elderly
made through the “Journal of Longevity,” a direct mail
advertisement purporting to be a health information maga-
zine. However, distributing “magazines” that are actually
100% marketing vehicles is not misleading as long as they
are identified as such. Collins (2004) notes that there are
approximately 116,000 custom “magazines” now published
by marketers to tout their wares, such as B Magazine, pub-
lished by Bloomingdales.
An example of the evolution of the blurring between
advertising and editorial content is the occasional advertise-
ment that is readily identified as such but turns out to be for
an unexpected product or service. For example, Mercedes-
Benz produced what appeared to be a preview for an action
movie shown in British movie theaters. However, when vis-
iting a Web site that was suggested in the preview, con-
sumers learned there was not a movie but an advertisement
for Mercedes-Benz (Kaikati and Kaikati 2004, p. 13). This
practice only misleads consumers briefly because they rec-
ognize the Web site as selling Mercedes automobiles.
Ad-sults from a Query
Metatags, language placed on Web sites that is invisible to
users but is read by search engines, allows a seller to
improve its rank ordering in search results by leveraging
repeat usage on its home page. The seller might even be
ranked above the brand owner, thus misdirecting con-
sumers. A recent Ninth Circuit Court decision carefully
analyzed metatag use. It rejected traditional trademark
infringement likelihood of confusion from metatag use. The
court reasoned that search engines provide a list of results,
and consumers are used to trying several before finding the
specific one they are seeking. As long as the domain name
is distinctive, consumers are not confused by incorrect
results. Nevertheless, the court found likelihood of initial-
interest confusion from metatag use and issued an injunc-
tion. It argued that initial-interest confusion was actionable
under trademark law even if no long-term source confusion
resulted. After being directed to the incorrect Web site of a
competitor, the consumer may decide to use it instead of the
one he or she was originally seeking, thus injuring the
trademark owner (Brookfield Communications v. West
Coast Entertainment Corporation 1999). Search engines
soon realized that they could sell search result priorities,
and several experimented with various methods of doing so.
However, in response to a complaint, the FTC warned
search engine firms that they should distinguish neutral
search engine results from paid-for advertising (FTC 2002;
Kopytoff 2002). Google now does so by identifying paid
search results as “sponsored links.”
Urgent Ad-formation
This category differs slightly from ad-sults because the lat-
ter appears to be information requested by the consumer,
whereas urgent ad-formation is advertising that appears to
be urgent nonadvertising information that was not requested
but might be of interest to most consumers. Advertising that
looks like important or urgent information can take several
forms: an important notice about the consumer’s account, a
notice from what appears to be an official government
source, a notice of winning a sweepstakes prize, or some-
thing that appears to be a check; in reality, though, such
“information” is an order form or discount coupon. An
approach that seems currently popular with credit card com-
panies is to send notices with “important information about
your account” that are nothing more than “checks” that may
be used to access the line of credit. Similar misleading prac-
tices are used in telemarketing and e-mail (Direct Market-
ing Association 2005).
With the advent of Internet use, some advertisers have
tried to make pop-up advertising look like an official sys-
tem warning. The National Advertising Division of the
Council of Better Business Bureaus has condemned the use
of advertisements disguised as system warnings and has
stated broadly that advertisers have an obligation to present
their product claims in a form that consumers will recog-
nize as advertising (Bonzi.com Software 2001).
Perhaps the most famous, recent examples of this prac-
tice are the magazine subscription companies’ sweepstake
notifications. These notices allegedly appear to tell con-
sumers that they were one of only a few finalists. Similar
contests often proclaim that consumers are “guaranteed” to
win at least one listed prize. Although many consumers are
familiar with these promotions and are not misled, an 88-
year-old man cashed in his life savings to buy an airplane
ticket to Florida to collect his winnings. The magazine com-
panies agreed with state attorneys general to tone down
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their implications of winning and have lost sales as a result
(Cyr 1999). In most cases, consumers may recognize
sweepstakes as marketing communications. Sweepstakes
also are subject to specific rules, mostly at the state level,
that require them to disclose prizes and the odds of winning
to avoid being deceptive (Taylor and Kopp 1991).
Advertainment
Advertainment practices are dominated by what are com-
monly called “product placements” in television shows and
movies. The value of product placements, including paid,
barter, and gratis placements, was estimated at $3.5 billion
in 2004 and was expected to grow to $4.2 billion in 2005.
Paid placements account for 29% of this value (Balasubra-
manian, Karrh, and Patwardhan 2006). Nielsen Media
Research reports that in the first quarter of 2005, the ten
television programs with the most product placements
accounted for nearly 13,000 placements—more than half
the total placements in 2004 (Enright 2005). Product place-
ments are expected to be used in approximately 75% of
prime-time network television shows and have become part
of the marketing mix for more than 1000 U.S. brands (Rus-
sell and Stern 2006).
A new form of product placement began in November
2005 when Shockwave.com was believed to be among the
first companies to announce programs for advertisers that
want to insert advertisements into online video games.
Shockwave.com hosts more than 200 games and claims
more than 20 million visitors monthly to its Web site. Its
advertising program measures impressions for each adver-
tisement. The advertisements are incorporated into the
game format, such as billboard advertisements around a vir-
tual skate park in a skateboarding game (Associated Press
2005). Video game advertising was estimated at $186 mil-
lion in 2005 and may reach $875 million by 2008 (Vranica
2005). Moore and Rideout (2007) also note that games are
common on marketers’ Web sites. They find that the major-
ity of food brands advertised to children also are promoted
to them through food-marketer Web sites, most of which
offer at least one online game.
As product placements continue, they may evolve in two
directions. First, the line between entertainment with a
product placement and advertising that looks like entertain-
ment is blurred. Not only are many video games accepting
product placements, but critics also note that some video
games are predominantly based on advertising, and such
“advergaming” is often targeted to children (Menin 2005;
Teinowitz 2005). Second, placements are evolving to be
more “active” in nature. As we noted previously, a talk
show guest who pitches a particular product is more akin to
being a poser than a mere product placement. However,
what if a movie or television character either uses a name
brand product is such a way as to demonstrate its perfor-
mance or durability or describes a product in favorable
terms? Are consumers likely to recognize such “active”
placements as advertising and consider them accordingly?
Would a fan of Mad TV recognize the paid placement of
Toyota Yaris in monthly skits on the show before the model
was available (Sutton and Zack 2006)?
Advertainment as a category has at least some practices
whose marketing nature is reasonably clear. Consumers
might well expect that advertisements, such as billboards,
that appear in the background of video games and movies
are paid-for advertisements. Adults also should recognize
when “host selling” (Campbell 2006) is occurring, as when
a talk show host holds up a product and describes its fea-
tures and benefits. Although this may be mole marketing, or
advertising in an unexpected place, consumers should not
be misled as to the nature of the advertising. However, a
movie or television show with a character using a particular
product may not appear to consumers to be advertising for
that product. A Brazilian study indicates that viewers may
not even assign promotional meanings to products placed in
television shows (La Pastina 2001).
Commercial Alert (2003b) filed a petition with the FTC
(and separately with the FCC) requesting that the FTC
require that advertisers disclose product placements in a
clear and conspicuous manner when they appear on the
television screen. The FTC has responded to the petition in
a letter to Commercial Alert (2005) that it has taken action
when misleading objective representations about the
product/service have been made in program-length
infomercials (JS&A Group Inc. 1989; Synchronal Corpora-
tion 1994), through misleading formats (Braswell et al.
2006; Georgetown Publishing House 1996), on search
engines, and in endorsements that lack disclosure of mater-
ial connections. The key phrase in the FTC’s (2005, p. 3)
response to Commercial Alert is when “objective claims
about the product’s attributes” have been made. Thus, the
FTC has not taken action (at this time) against passive prod-
uct placements because of (1) a lack of objective claims
being made about such product placements and (2) a lack of
evidence that such objective claims might be misleading
under the deception policy statement. This reasoning is also
consistent with the nature of extrinsic evidence in FTC
deception cases that focuses on the net impression of such
advertised claims (cf. Andrews and Maronick 1995; Maron-
ick 1990). This phrase in the FTC’s response also raises the
question whether any masked marketing techniques should
be challenged by the FTC if it is not also challenging decep-
tive product claims made in the masked marketing format.
We address this question in the following sections.
The Perspective of Reasonable
Consumers
The second requirement for deception in the FTC’s (1983)
“Policy Statement on Deception” is that the practice is
examined from the perspective of the consumer acting rea-
sonably under the circumstances. If the representation or
practice affects or is directed to a particular group (e.g., tar-
get market), the FTC will examine reasonableness from the
perspective of that group. For example, young children may
be less likely to understand the selling intent behind adver-
tisers’ Web site games (Moore and Rideout 2007).
Although much of the deception statement discussion of
reasonable consumers examines consumer interpretation of
product claims, the same rule appears to apply to masked
marketing. The statement specifically notes with apparent
approval that the FTC found deception when a sales repre-
sentative misrepresented the purpose of the initial contact
with potential customers (Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. v.
FTC 1979). Presumably, reasonable consumers were likely
to be deceived by the initial contact.
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Ford and Calfee (1986) point out that reasonable con-
sumers are not necessarily rational from the perspective of
economics. Indeed, it is well recognized that people use
heuristic shortcuts to make complex decisions (Hammond,
Keeney, and Raiffa 2006; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). A
common heuristic, which we noted in the introduction, is to
be skeptical of marketing messages and resist being per-
suaded by them while trusting personal communications to
a greater degree (Balasubramanian 1994; Darke and Ritchie
2007). This is a reasonable approach for consumers to deal
with advertising clutter and misleading advertising, even
though in some circumstances, it may lead consumers to
ignore marketing messages for products they would buy if
they had complete and accurate information about the
products.
Certain laws and rules recognize the reasonableness of
consumer skepticism of advertising by prohibiting decep-
tion regarding the marketing nature of communications. For
this reason, the FTC Telemarketing Rule (16 C.F.R §
310.4[d][2]) (but not the FTC’s Door-to-Door Sales Rule
[16 C.F.R. § 429]) requires that sellers identify themselves
promptly and that the purpose of the call is to sell goods 
or services, and the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (15 U.S.C.
7704; Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornogra-
phy and Marketing) prohibits deceptive “from” and “sub-
ject” lines. However, some state laws, now preempted by
the federal act, would have required an “ADV” prefix in the
subject line for the earliest possible notification to con-
sumers of the commercial content of the message. Simi-
larly, FCC Commissioner Adelstein (2005) indicates that
prior FCC actions require disclosure of the source of video
news releases. He also notes that current FCC regulations
require disclosure of paid product placements. As of this
writing, the FCC has not responded to a petition to regulate
product placements more tightly (Commercial Alert 2003a).
Some forms of masked marketing are discoverable as
such by diligent or experienced consumers. Infomercials
now often contain some disclosure, perhaps only at the
beginning or the end, that they are paid-for programming.
Advertisements that appear to be magazine articles or even
entire magazines often disclose their true nature somewhere
in fine print. Sweepstakes notifications usually contain
small print explaining the odds (as required by most states)
and therefore identify the likely prize to be won and the loss
probability of winning more desirable prizes. Given the
limited amount of time consumers spend paying attention to
advertising, there is an open question whether consumers
who miss such disclosures are behaving reasonably under
the deception statement. It probably is true that any sort of
reasonably noticeable disclosure makes FTC action less
likely. The FTC requires disclosures to be “clear and con-
spicuous” in its rules and case law; however, few current
televised ad disclosures meet the criteria (Hoy and Andrews
2004).
In situations in which the truth is eventually revealed,
often not voluntarily by the marketer, there typically is
some negative publicity for the marketer, as when Wal-
Mart failed to disclose its funding for a recreational vehicle
cross-country trip and blog site that favorably reviewed the
local Wal-Mart at each stop (Gogoi 2006). However, it is
not clear whether such negative publicity affects future
sales (i.e., was the deception material to purchasing deci-
sions); however, a clear and conspicuous disclosure would
appear to resolve the question of possible deception. Some
marketers believe that the identification of agents as such is
critical to long-term success and that paid-for undercover
posers are disingenuous (Walker 2004). Similar to the FTC
endorsement guidelines, the Word of Mouth Marketing
Association recommends disclosure in its new draft code of
ethics (available at http://www.womma.org/ethicscode.
htm).
Both the FTC’s deception statement and its endorsement
guidelines (issued in 1980) reflect the notion that reason-
able consumers may be less skeptical of personal opinions
than of advertising claims. Both state that claims phrased as
opinions may be deceptive if they are not honestly held or if
the basis of the opinion is misrepresented (16 C.F.R. §
255.1[a]). The guidelines are not binding by themselves but
suggest that endorsement and testimonial statements in
advertising should reflect the honest beliefs, opinions, and
experiences of the endorser. For example, endorsers who
claim that they have used the product must have actually
used the product (16 C.F.R. § 255.1[b]).
Because consumers might be misled into believing that
an endorsement is being made solely out of genuine enthu-
siasm for the product, the guidelines also require the disclo-
sure of any unexpected commercial connection between the
marketer and the endorser (16 C.F.R. § 255.5). Further-
more, the guidelines state that endorsers represented
directly or by implication to be actual consumers should be
actual consumers. Otherwise, the marketer should disclose
that the people are not actual consumers but rather family
members, business associates, and so forth, in relationship
to the company or its owner(s) (16 C.F.R. § 255.2[b]). In its
response to Commercial Alert’s petition on buzz marketing,
the FTC’s associate director for advertising practices cited
the guidelines to indicate that nondisclosure of the sponsor-
ship relationship between marketer and agent would be
deceptive. The FTC (2006) would consider action on a
case-by-case basis.
Unfortunately, the guidelines offer little as to what might
constitute an unexpected commercial connection. The Pat
Boone consent order originally required that the singer/
actor disclose his financial interest in a venture when he
was paid on a per-bottle basis rather than paid a standard
fixed fee for filming the commercial. However, the order
was later modified to remove this disclosure requirement
(Cooga Mooga Inc. 1978). The third example presented in
§ 255.5 of the endorsement guidelines is of a restaurant that
advertises that patrons will be interviewed about the food
for possible appearance in television advertising. Because
that incentive might affect the weight or credibility of a
patron’s endorsement in the minds of consumers, it should
be disclosed in the advertisements. This suggests that incen-
tives given to posers and buzz and viral agents, such as free
product samples or significant price reductions, should be
disclosed so that consumers exposed to marketing messages
from these sources can evaluate their credibility.
Although the guidelines are expressly limited to endorse-
ments and testimonials that appear in advertising, there is
no policy reason that the same principles should not apply
to statements made in the masked marketing context.
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Indeed, the guidelines assume that consumers will recog-
nize the marketing context of the statements, but masked
marketing intentionally attempts to hide that context. If rea-
sonable consumers are less skeptical of masked marketing
messages than readily identifiable marketing messages,
there is a greater reason to apply the protections of the
endorsement guidelines to masked marketing as the FTC
(2006) implicitly recognizes.
Materiality
The third requirement of the deception statement is materi-
ality—that is, the representation, omission, or practice is
one that is likely to affect consumer choice or conduct
toward the product. The deception statement notes that the
FTC will presume materiality for several types of claims
and situations (e.g., express claims; seller knowledge or
intent in making the claims; claims about health, safety, or
other important characteristics), but it is silent as to whether
such a presumption would be applied to masked marketing.
However, the marketing literature on consumer skepticism
of advertising and trust of personal communications and the
deception statement’s apparent approval of the FTC’s case
against encyclopedia salespeople both suggest that masking
the marketing nature of communications would be consid-
ered material for reasonable consumers (Encyclopaedia
Britannica Inc. v. FTC 1979).
A strong argument also can be made that marketers
intend to disguise the marketing nature of the communica-
tions, satisfying the presumption of materiality in the state-
ment. The goal of masked marketing is to have consumers
pay attention to the communication but not realize that it is
a marketing message that they otherwise might ignore. The
urgent ad-formation category of practices goes one step fur-
ther. Not only does the marketer intend to disguise the mar-
keting purpose of the message, but he or she also tries to
make the disguise appear material to consumers.
The few marketing studies on masked marketing prac-
tices have shown that the practices tend to influence con-
sumer behavior. For example, an empirical study found that
game players remember 25%–30% of the brands immedi-
ately after playing and still remembered 10%–15% of the
brands five months later (Nelson 2002). Similarly, a recent
comprehensive study of product placements found that
placements may increase product recall and even favorably
change attitude toward the brand (Balasubramanian, Karrh,
and Patwardhan 2006). Despite these changes in consumer
recall, we acknowledge that many of these studies suggest
less influence on intent to purchase. Further research has
suggested that a product’s connection to characters in a
television show and the viewer’s relationship with the char-
acters also influence viewers’ attitudes toward products
placed in situation comedy television shows (Russell and
Stern 2006). Finally, a recent Jupiter Research survey found
that though viral marketing campaigns increased brand
awareness, only 15% were reported to motivate consumers
to repeat the marketing message to others (Marketing News
2007). Although such campaigns might cause consumers to
be more likely to buy, it is rare that they are likely to repeat
the message and thus influence possible purchases of other
consumers.
Public Policy Discussion
Degree of Consumer Injury
In general, masked marketing practices are likely to mislead
reasonable consumers materially and thus violate the decep-
tion statement. However, the FTC’s statement notes that as
a matter of policy, when consumers can easily evaluate the
product or service and the product or service is inexpensive
and frequently purchased, the FTC will carefully consider
whether to bring an enforcement action. Thus, although
consumer injury is not required under the deception state-
ment, it can be an important factor for the FTC’s considera-
tion of whether to invest the resources necessary to pursue a
particular case. When consumers can easily evaluate inex-
pensive products, the FTC believes that there is little incen-
tive for advertisers to misrepresent the product because the
long-term goal should be to encourage repeat purchases. If
consumers learn about masked marketing and are unhappy
about it, they may not repurchase a product if they were
misled about the marketing origin of an initial
communication.
Such market self-correction assumes that many, if not
most, consumers remember the initial deception for particu-
lar products, even though they buy and use thousands of
products every year, often with little involvement in any
particular purchasing decision. It also ignores the injury of
short-term diversion of consumers to make at least one pur-
chase they otherwise may not have made. Several courts
have recognized a similar concept called “initial interest
confusion” in trademark law. Marketers use deceptively
similar marks at least initially to confuse consumers as to
the source of the goods. Even if consumers realize the cor-
rect product identity before purchase, several courts have
held that the initial diversion of consumer interest is action-
able because some consumers simply choose the new prod-
uct despite their initial intentions to purchase the well-
known brand (Rothman 2005). Footnote 58 of the deception
statement similarly talks about wrongful diversion of con-
sumers, but the text of the statement suggests that prevent-
ing a one-time diversion for inexpensive, frequently pur-
chased consumer goods is not an enforcement priority.
However, the statement does not preclude FTC action in
such cases. So-called fly-by-night marketers live by short-
term deception with a long-term plan to offer one decep-
tively promoted product after another and not to seek repeat
purchasers. Although the injury to individual consumers
may be financially small, the total injury to the market may
be sufficiently substantial to justify FTC action. Further-
more, the actions of such marketers over time also may jus-
tify FTC enforcement to prevent future deception involving
seemingly unrelated products. In some cases, a few con-
sumers may suffer large injury. The FTC condemned fur-
nace repair companies whose sales agents posed as inspec-
tors offering a free inspection. The catch was that the
“inspectors” would then disassemble the furnaces and
refuse to reassemble them until a service contract was pur-
chased (Davis Furnace Co. 1961; Holland Furnace Co.
1958).
The FTC pursued several early television infomercials
for inexpensive products not only because of their decep-
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tive format but also for misleading or unsubstantiated
claims about the product. The products in these cases were
inexpensive, and some were easily evaluated, such as sun-
glasses (JS&A Group Inc. 1989), a book on government
grants and loans (James R. Wyatt 1993), and systems for
learning to read or developing a photographic memory
(Mega Systems Int’l Inc. 1998). Other inexpensive products
were somewhat more difficult to evaluate through product
use, such as weight loss, disease prevention, and baldness
remedies. Because of the relatively long periods of evalua-
tion, the existence of many other factors that might influ-
ence the condition, and the lack of strict objective criteria
(even weight loss can include losing weight but gaining
muscle), evaluating these latter products is akin to evaluat-
ing credence attributes rather than experience attributes
(Petty 1992, pp. 36–37). However, after the adoption of the
deception statement, only approximately 10% of FTC
advertising cases involved deception regarding search or
experience attributes for frequently purchased products
(Petty 1992).
Masked Marketing and Specific Marketing
Regulations
Some marketing practices are presumed to cause sufficient
consumer injury to justify specific regulation of those prac-
tices. For example, the endorsement guidelines on their
own terms apply to any masked marketing practices that
involve advertising (albeit disguised), and the FTC has
stated it will apply the guidelines to word-of-mouth market-
ing situations as well. In addition, some practices, such as
sweepstakes (Taylor and Kopp 1991), distance marketing,
and telephone and e-mail marketing, are regulated by spe-
cific rules.
For example, the FTC’s Door-to-Door Sales Rule
requires that sellers provide a three-day cooling-off period
for sales made outside the ordinary place of business and
that their sales agents inform consumers about the period
and how to exercise their right to cancel the transaction. At
first glance, this would appear not to apply to buzz market-
ing because the agents do not consummate the sales; that is,
they merely suggest that consumers “check out” the prod-
uct. However, in the case in which a buzz agent shows the
consumer how to order the product online, the requirements
of the rule would appear to be satisfied. Thus, the marketer
would be liable for financial penalties for failing to provide
information on the three-day cancellation period.
Similarly, a buzz agent who telephoned a friend to “talk
up” a product would need to follow the telemarketing laws
just as one who e-mailed friends would need to follow the
rules on commercial e-mailing. For telemarketing, several
U.S. states have “get-to-the-point” laws, which require
callers to identify their purpose within a short time. A few
states follow the European practice of requiring cooling-off
periods for all telephone-solicited sales (Cain 1994). The
FTC Telemarketing Rule (16 C.F.R. § 310.4[d][2]) requires
that sales calls be identified. However, it is not clear
whether these rules would apply to calls that merely “talk
up” a product without attempting to close the sale.
Under federal law, telephone solicitations only may
occur between the hours of 8:00 A.M. and 9:00 P.M. and may
not be harassing by repeat calls (16 C.F.R. § 310), and cold
1Ordinary consumer endorsers must truthfully describe their experiences
with the endorsed product but are not required to reasonably investigate or
substantiate the effectiveness of the product. The FTC consent agreements
have required celebrity endorsers to make a reasonable inquiry into the
truth of the claims (e.g., Cooga Mooga Inc. 1978), and occasional private
lawsuits have held celebrities financially liable for negligence in making
misleading claims when the advertiser cannot be located or is in bank-
ruptcy (Kertz and Ohanian 1991). Expert endorsers must actually possess
appropriate expertise and rely on it when making their endorsements (16
C.F.R. 255.3[b]).
calls to cell phones are prohibited (47 C.F.R. § 64; Cain
1996). Notably, activities of buzz agents might easily vio-
late these provisions. Furthermore, many states, and now
the FTC, offer a do-not-call list, which marketers are
required to check before making telemarketing calls, unless
they have a preexisting relationship with the customer. Per-
haps buzz agents who call their friends will be able to claim
a preexisting relationship even if they violate other telemar-
keting rules.
A court of appeals in Arizona has held that the use of an
automatic dialing system to send commercial text messages
to cell phones violates the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp. 2005). The court noted
that the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 may also apply to cell
phone text messaging (Petty 2003). The CAN-SPAM Act
allows marketers to send unsolicited commercial e-mail but
prohibits misleading header, “from,” or “subject” lines, and
it also requires that consumers be given a method for opting
out of receiving e-mail messages from the same source. The
law also prohibits marketers from harvesting e-mail
addresses from Web sites (typically using robot crawlers),
relaying commercial e-mails through other computers with-
out permission, and using programs to generate possible
e-mail addresses by combining popular names with e-mail
locations (15 U.S.C. § 7701). Viral marketers that rely on
e-mail communications need to make sure their agents do
not run afoul of these laws. Use of a misleading subject line
and the lack of notification on how to stop future e-mails
are two requirements that agents are likely to violate.
Policy Recommendations
The foregoing discussion suggests that masked marketing
practices can often violate the FTC’s deception statement,
endorsement guidelines, and other regulations of specific
marketing practices. Nevertheless, we offer three public
policy recommendations. First, the FTC should update its
deception statement and endorsement guidelines to include
modern masked marketing examples, clarifying whether the
marketing nature of communications might be deceptive.
New examples should illustrate specifically how the classic
law enforcement principles apply to examples involving
recent technology, such as cell phone texting and Internet
communications of various forms. These updates also
should clarify circumstances under which marketers will be
held responsible for statements made by their agents.1 If
politics prevent the FTC from doing this, the Council of
Better Business Bureaus may be able to more easily update
its guidelines.
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Second, the FTC should clarify the types of commercial
connections it believes are currently unexpected by con-
sumers. If a marketing agent does not disclose his or her
status, is there a de minimis connection (e.g., a coupon for
pennies off the retail price) that is so small that consumers
would not expect the incentive to bias their views? The
FTC has already recognized that “psychic” rewards, such as
being selected to appear in a television commercial, might
be an unexpected commercial connection that should be
disclosed (16 C.F.R. § 255.5). Perhaps being part of a select
group of consumers that receive new products before the
general public should also be disclosed. Market research
could be conducted to determine whether such selection
biases the product evaluations of consumers compared with
those who are not selected to be in such an “elite” group.
Third, the FTC should clarify its position on product
placements and advertainment. In some cases, such as
video games, product placement often appears clearly as
advertising or at least as a re-creation of advertising to
enhance the game’s realism. The FTC should clarify
whether it will evaluate and enforce the content of such
advertising images. Similarly, the FTC should clarify
whether it will examine the content of product-related state-
ments made during celebrity interviews or made by charac-
ters in movie or television programming. Roehm, Roehm,
and Boone (2004) suggest that these two types of product
mentions are stored differently in memory, with the
“celebrity plug” being remembered by product category but
the story line use being stored in memory about the televi-
sion show. The authors conclude that for marketers who
want to stimulate future purchases of their brand, the
celebrity plug may be more useful than the character men-
tion of the brand.
More typical product placements involve only a brief
view and perhaps use of a product in passing as part of
entertainment. The characters do not praise the product or
mention anything about its performance or attributes. To
date, research indicates that these placements may not even
be consciously perceived or remembered by consumers, but
they might still have an emotional impact on purchasing
decisions. For example, visual-only placements, typically
the lowest-priced placements, are processed by viewers at a
low level of cognition and therefore may lead to stronger
emotional and purchase-intent effects than more elaborate
placements that mention the product by name or show the
product in use (Balasubramanian, Karrh, and Patwardhan
2006). Research evidence in consumer behavior has long
demonstrated the positive effects of pictorial and vivid
imagery used in advertisements on consumer attitudes
(Kisielius and Sternthal 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981).
Arguably, such product placements might qualify as a form
of “mental marketing,” as we discussed previously.
Because these practices may be beyond the realm of objec-
tive claim verification in current deception policy, any such
evaluation may need to come from the FCC or the FTC’s
consumer unfairness authority (FTC 1984, codified in 15
U.S.C. 45[n]). However, the FTC (2005) has made it clear
that it will not pursue any such placements for deceptively
omitting a disclosure that the placement was a paid one.
Conclusion
Although buzz and viral marketing currently are touted as
the latest methods for addressing the twin problems of con-
sumer skepticism and consumer overload with marketing
communications (e.g., clutter), masked marketing has been
practiced for most of the twentieth century, if not longer. In
some cases, legal and regulatory requirements are clear;
marketing messages must not be disguised as third-party
opinion, and agents promoting products must make it clear
if they are getting paid to do so (or own the marketing com-
pany), if these facts are not well understood by consumers.
Unfortunately, the practice of marketing advances at a
pace far faster than that of marketing regulation. For this
reason, marketers must rely on existing laws pertaining to
testimonials, personal selling, telemarketing, and commer-
cial e-mail to address modern practices that, though similar,
are also somewhat different. Careful analysis of the princi-
ples expressed in these laws provides reasonable guidance
at this point for modern masked marketing practices.
Updating existing materials with modern examples would
help clarify when legal challenge may be likely.
Finally, it seems clear that as new marketing practices are
developed, there needs to be research regarding these prac-
tices. Do consumers recognize these practices as marketing
messages and react with the usual skepticism? Alterna-
tively, because “ordinary people” and even friends or per-
ceived friends (e.g., television characters) are involved, do
consumers find these messages to be more persuasive than
readily recognizable marketing messages? Are masked
marketing messages even perceived as factual messages at
all, or are they processed as opinions of other people? If the
latter is true, how does that processing differ from the pro-
cessing of recognizable marketing messages, and is this a
concern for public policy makers? Does simply encourag-
ing consumers, perhaps with a small reward, to talk about a
new product predispose them to develop more positive atti-
tudes or beliefs about the product or to communicate more
positive product messages than those without marketer
encouragement? Would consumers truly internalize such
product beliefs and attitudes as a result of practices or sim-
ply identify peripherally with the company or brand?
Finally, at what level or type of reward do most people
believe that other people would become biased, whether
conscious of that bias or not?
Ultimately, the long-term success of masked marketing
techniques and the need for their regulation depend on the
answers to these questions. In addition, it would be useful
to conduct research comparing the relative effectiveness of
various forms of masked marketing. We found only one
study that compared the effectiveness of a product mention
by a character within the story line of a television program
(an active product placement) with that of a celebrity prod-
uct plug within a talk show (a poser, if the celebrity was
paid) (Roehm, Roehm, and Boone 2004). As we noted pre-
viously, the study results suggest that the two types of prod-
uct mentions are stored differently in memory and that the
celebrity plug would be more effective in stimulating sales
because it is remembered with the product rather than with
the entertainment program.
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Misleading marketing practices have been around for a
long time; as a result, consumers have become increasingly
skeptical of marketing, and government agencies (as well as
the industry) have pursued enforcement and regulations in
an attempt to control misleading claims. When considering
masked marketing, policy makers, marketers, and con-
sumers should consider whether they want a similar result
for this type of practice. By adopting such practices, mar-
keters make it more likely that consumer skepticism will
increase about any information provided about a product or
service, whether obviously advertising or apparently from
an independent third party. As with advertising, the long-
term result may be that such practices become less effec-
tive. However, the problem of misleading advertising is not
contained within the sphere of marketing and consumers.
The practice of masked marketing may cause increased
skepticism about how people relate to strangers and
acquaintances and how people relate to one another in per-
son and on Web sites. This no longer is a question of what
type of marketing system society wants to have but rather
of how much influence the marketing system should have
over the type of society we enjoy.
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